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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the most difficult problems we currently face are unacceptably 
high rates of violent crime in Indian country.  A Bureau of Justice 
Statistics study found recently that American Indians are victims of 
violent crime at rates more than twice the national average — far 
exceeding any other ethnic group in the country . . . . This is simply 
unacceptable.  Just like all Americans, Native Americans deserve to live 
in safe communities. 
    United States Attorney General John Ashcroft2 
 
Prior to the colonial establishments in North America, American Indians enjoyed 
a sense of sovereignty, which is largely taken for granted by the citizens of the 
United States today.  Following the birth of the United States as a sovereign entity, 
legislation and judicial decisions have essentially stripped Indian tribes of any 
meaningful control over violent/felonious crimes committed in Indian country.  With 
a violent crime rate twice that of the United States’ national average, an overly 
burdened federal prosecutor’s office, and an even larger possible crime rate increase 
due to gaming in Indian country, now is the time to return “actual” criminal felony 
jurisdiction to tribal courts.3     
Imagine, if you will, terrorists from abroad walking and living among us, and 
committing horrific crimes of violence, all without the fear of being punished, 
because the United Nations would not recognize our authority to punish those who 
were harming our citizens. Were the citizens of any city or state of this nation to 
experience the same rate of crime and be forbidden to effectively punish those who 
were committing the crimes, this author has no doubt that the citizens would revolt.  
Allowing tribes the authority to effectively punish non-Indians would go a long way 
in providing a safer environment in Indian country. 
This article will trace the history of tribal criminal jurisdiction following the 
arrival of the colonists, through the foundation of the United States government, and 
will lead into where it stands today.  On this journey, this article will discuss 
significant statutes and case law dealing with the role tribal courts have played in 
handling criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and will also discuss some important 
studies conducted by the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics and 
others on the current state of violent crime in Indian country, as well as the tribes’ 
ability to handle it.  Finally, this article will look to the future of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction by looking at the changing view of the United States federal government. 
                                                                 
2United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the Native American Heritage 
Event (Nov. 28, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/agremarksnativeamericanheritage.htm 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2003) [hereinafter United States Attorney General John Ashcroft]. 
3Technically, tribes do have jurisdiction over felony crimes; however, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 capped the punishments of crimes that tribal courts can dole out in Indian 
country at a maximum of one year in jail, or less, and/or a maximum $5000 fine.  See Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/6
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Tribal legal systems, prior to the arrival of the colonists in America, varied from 
tribe to tribe.4  That each tribe enjoyed a sense of sovereignty prior to the colonists’ 
arrival is not to be debated.  As the colonists, and eventually the United States 
federal government, claimed more and more territory, the sovereignty once enjoyed 
by the tribes began to diminish.  Chief Justice Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh5 
recognized the sovereignty of the tribes, but recognized it as something less than 
complete sovereignty and later relegated the tribes to the status of dependant 
nations.6  This, and other rulings, placed tribal jurisdiction over any matter on the 
chopping block, awaiting its determinative fate. 
A.  General Crimes Act and Ex Parte Crow Dog 
One of the first areas of tribal sovereignty to get the axe was in the area of 
criminal jurisdiction.  In order to curtail problems with non-Indians and Indian 
populations, the federal government, following the Revolutionary War, extended its 
jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against Indians, but allowed the tribes 
to retain full jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes committed in Indian 
country.7  This jurisdiction employed by the federal government was codified in 18 
U.S.C. § 1152, and is known as the General Crimes, or Indian Country Crimes, Act.  
Notably, the statute provides for the allowance of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the 
tribes over Indians and non-Indians where a treaty had already given them that 
option.8  The act reads: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
                                                                 
4FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 § 6.B (1982). 
521 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
6See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1832). 
718 U.S.C. § 1151 defines “Indian country” as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term “Indian 
country”, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding 
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependant Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through 
the same. 
818 U.S.C. § 1152 (2003). 
Deleted: F
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This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing 
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law 
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive 
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes 
respectively.9 
The federal government quickly changed its mind regarding exclusive tribal 
jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes as a reaction to the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.10  Crow Dog was a member of the 
Brule Sioux Band, who was convicted in federal court for murdering Spotted Tail, 
another Brule Sioux Band member.11  Crow Dog petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court under a writ of habeus corpus to be released from federal prison and 
to have the murder conviction against him dropped.12  The defendant argued that the 
federal government could not punish him because the murder occurred against 
another Indian while in Indian country and therefore fell under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribe according to the General Crimes Act.13   
Relying on statutes and treaties with the Sioux Indians, the federal government 
argued that it had jurisdiction over “any person who commits murder” within the 
territory of the United States, in spite of another revised statute which excluded 
jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes committed in Indian country.14  The 
treaty relied upon by the federal government stated in part that the Indians were to 
“deliver up the wrong-doer”15 who commits “a wrong or depredation upon [a] person 
or property of any one . . . .”16   
The Supreme Court agreed but held that the treaty must be read in its entirety in 
order to gain its full meaning.17  Where the preceding paragraph is also read, the 
Court held that the only meaning that could be determined was that whites and tribes 
were to hand over those wrong-doers who had committed crimes against the other 
party, not amongst themselves.18  The charges and conviction against Crow Dog 
were dismissed.19 
                                                                 
9Id. (emphasis added). 
10109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
11Id. at 557. 
12Id.  
13Id. 
14Id. 
15Id. at 563. 
16Id. 
17Id. at 567-68. 
18Id. 
19Id. at 572. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/6
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Essentially, the General Crimes Act allowed the tribes exclusive jurisdiction over 
Indian vs. Indian crimes of any nature, and gave concurrent jurisdiction to the tribes 
over Indian vs. non-Indian crimes.  But the holding of Crow Dog20 sent fear 
throughout the United States Congress that Indians would literally, and actually, be 
getting away with murder if things were to remain as they were.21  The result?  The 
Major Crimes Act. 
B.  The Major Crimes Act 
18 U.S.C. § 1153, more commonly referred to as the Major Crimes Act, created 
federal jurisdiction over a few specified crimes committed by an Indian against 
another Indian or non-Indian.  The Major Crimes Act reads: 
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian 
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under 109A, incest, assault 
with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an 
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, 
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within 
Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other 
persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined 
and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of 
the State in which such offense was committed as are in fore at the time of 
such offense.22 
Originally, the Major Crimes Act included only seven “major” crimes, but the list 
has been expanded to fourteen.23  Crimes not listed in the Major Crimes Act remain 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe, except in the case where jurisdiction has 
been granted to the States under the infamous Public Law 280.24  Essentially, the 
purpose behind the Major Crimes Act was to give the federal courts jurisdiction over 
Indian criminals.   
                                                                 
20Id. 
21Some scholars suggest that much of the fear created was merely a manufactured hue and 
cry. 
2218 U.S.C. § 1153 (2003) (emphasis added).  Originally, the Major Crimes Act also 
covered the misdemeanor (usually) crime of theft, but eliminated the confusion in a 1984 
amendment, which replaced the crime of “theft” with “felony theft.”  WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 161 (1998). 
23WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 153 (1998). 
2467 Stat. 588 (1953). 
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It is possible, however, that a tribe could exercise criminal jurisdiction over the 
“Major” crimes,25 but the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 essentially strips the tribal 
judicial decision of any effectiveness.26  In addition, tribal authorities have been 
highly critical of the quality of prosecution by the U.S. Attorney’s office under the 
Major Crimes Act and have often attempted to assert jurisdiction on their own.27  
Such an example can be found in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.28 
C.  Oliphant v. Suquamish 
In 1973, fed up with the lack of law enforcement against non-Indians on its 
reservation, the Suquamish Tribe of the Port Madison Reservation in the State of 
Washington passed new tribal law and order codes and posted signs at the entrance 
to the reservation warning all visitors that entrance would subject them to the 
jurisdiction and laws of the Tribe, whether Indian or non-Indian.29  A few years later, 
tribal authorities arrested—for separate incidents—two non-Indians, Mark Oliphant 
and Daniel Belgarde, who were living on the reservation.30  Oliphant was arrested for 
assaulting a Tribal officer and Belgarde was arrested for evading Tribal authorities 
on a high-speed chase, which ended when Belgarde crashed into a Tribal police 
vehicle.31  In compliance with the Tribal codes, both were arraigned before the tribal 
court.32  The defendants then sought relief in United States District Court under a 
writ of habeus corpus, claiming that the Tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over 
them.33   
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied 
the defendants their relief and held that the defendants were subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Tribe.34  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s findings.35   
Absent an affirmative grant of power from the United States Congress, the 
United States Supreme Court held that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over 
                                                                 
25See Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that where a tribe is in 
compliance with the rights defined under ICRA, the Tribe has the authority to try tribal 
members for crimes which also fall under the Major Crimes Act). 
26See supra note 3. 
27CANBY, supra note 23, at 158. 
28435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
29Id. at 194. 
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Id. at 195. 
35Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/6
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non-Indians; the Court reversed both the Ninth Circuit and district court’s findings.36  
The Court based its holding on the age old claim that the powers were inconsistent 
with Indian status as dependant sovereigns.37  In dicta, the court reasoned that even 
though tribes, and more specifically, tribal courts, are more advanced than they once 
were, (not to mention the Constitutional liberty protections afforded in the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968) it must be obvious to everyone that tribes were incapable 
of exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.38  Why were the tribes 
incapable?  Because when the tribes “submitted” themselves to the sovereignty of 
the United States, they “gave up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the US 
except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”39  Whether a person agrees or disagrees 
with the reasoning of the Court, the potential “fix” for the tribes would now seem to 
be in the hands of Congress.   
Barely two weeks after the holding in Oliphant,40 the U.S. Supreme Court created 
future controversy by upholding a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over the tribe’s own 
members.  While dealing ultimately with the double jeopardy issue, United States v. 
Wheeler41 has had determinative implications on the issue of whether or not tribes 
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 
D.  United States v. Wheeler  
The defendant was a member of the Navajo Tribe who had been convicted in 
Tribal Court and punished under the laws of the Tribe for contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor and for disorderly conduct.42  He was then subsequently 
convicted and sentenced under federal law for the crime of statutory rape.43   
The defendant argued that double jeopardy barred his subsequent sentence in 
federal court.44  The “Dual Sovereignty Doctrine” establishes that no double jeopardy 
attaches where there are two governmental sources that derive their jurisdiction from 
two separate sources.  For example, state sovereignty is inherent, and federal 
sovereignty stems from the U.S. Constitution, therefore, there is no double jeopardy 
issue when prosecuted by the federal government and the State.   
The question in this case was whether the federal plenary power over tribes really 
makes tribes creatures of the federal government.45  The Supreme Court held that the 
                                                                 
36Id. at 208. 
37Id. at 210. 
38Id. 
39Id. 
40435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
41435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
42Id. at 315. 
43Id. at 315-16. 
44Id. at 330. 
45Id. at 322. 
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Tribe’s sovereignty was not created by Congress, but existed independently (as far as 
criminal jurisdiction is concerned) as a separate sovereign.  Therefore, the federal 
government was not placing the defendant in double jeopardy.46   
What most people focus on in the Wheeler decision, however, is the Court’s 
insistence and constant referral to a tribe’s right of jurisdiction over its “members.”47  
Some argue that the Court, in its constant referral to jurisdiction over tribal 
“members,” was implying that tribes may not have jurisdiction over Indian, non-
tribal members. Several years later the Court decided to follow through with its 
implied threat in Wheeler;48 the Court removed criminal jurisdiction from the tribes 
over Indian non-Tribal members in Duro v. Reina.49     
E.  Duro v. Reina and the “Duro Fix” 
The Pima Maricopa Indian Tribe attempted to assert Tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over Albert Duro for a murder which took place on the Pima Maricopa Indian 
Reservation after the United States Attorney dropped the charges against him in 
federal court.50  Though Indian, Duro was not a member of the Pima Maricopa 
Tribe.51  Duro had been living on the Pima Maricopa Reservation with his girlfriend 
and also worked for the tribally owned PiCopa Construction Company.52  The 
victim, a 14 year old boy, was also not a member of the Pima Maricopa Tribe.53  
Additionally, because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 only allowed the tribe to 
fix punishments at less than one year, the Tribal criminal code involved only 
misdemeanor-type crimes; therefore, Duro was merely charged with illegally firing a 
weapon on the reservation.54   
After reaffirming its previous holding in Wheeler (that a tribe has exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction over its own members),55 the Supreme Court turned to the issue 
                                                                 
46Id. 
47
“The sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly does 
not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their 
dependent status.”  Id. at 326.  “That the Navajo Tribe’s power to punish offenses against 
tribal law committed by its members is an aspect of its retained sovereignty is further 
supported by the absence of any federal grant of such power.”  Id. at 326-27.  “The power to 
punish offenses against tribal law committed by tribe members, which was part of the 
Navajos’ primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away from them . . . .”  Id. at 328. 
(emphasis added). 
48435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
49495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
50Id. at 679-80. 
51Id. at 679. 
52Id.  
53Id. 
54Id. at 681. 
55Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 
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of “whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes in their dependent status within our 
scheme of government includes the power of criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.”56   
In overruling the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found 
that because Congress made no attempt to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction to 
members of the tribe, and because the majority of statutes dealing with tribal 
criminal jurisdiction mentioned only the authority of the tribe over Indians, a tribe 
did indeed have jurisdiction over all Indians, tribal members or not.57   
Referring back to its holdings in Wheeler58 and Oliphant,59 and once again citing 
to the dependent sovereign status of the tribes, the Supreme Court found that what 
actual sovereign authority remained in the tribes was only that which was necessary 
to deal with internal relations.  Subsequently, the Court held that tribes have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.60  (Although this author would argue 
that murder on your reservation would seem to be important “internal relations.”)61  
The court reasoned that because criminal penalties are so “serious an intrusion on 
personal liberty,”62 criminal jurisdiction over non-Tribal persons, whether Indian or 
non-Indian, was one of those powers “necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their 
submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States.”63  The Court further 
explained that non-members often have no say in tribal government or elections, and 
it would be unfair to hold non-members to a standard to which they have no say.64  
However, the Court did not explain why foreign nationals, who commit crimes in the 
United States, and who have no say in U.S. government or elections, are still subject 
to the criminal jurisdiction of the federal or state governments. 
In Duro,65 the Tribe and the federal government argued that a jurisdictional void 
would be created where tribes would have no power to punish non-member Indians 
for any minor violation and where states were unwilling to do so.66  Unfortunately, 
this argument fell on the deaf ears of the Court.   
                                                                 
56Duro, 495 U.S. at 684. 
57Id. at 683. 
58Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313. 
59Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. 
60Duro, 495 U.S. at 686. 
61It is difficult for this author to understand how Congress can allow the states to prosecute 
citizens of other states for crimes committed in their respective states, but not allow the tribes 
the same protection. 
62Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 688. 
65Duro, 495 U.S. 676. 
66Id. at 696. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
422 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:413 
To its credit, Congress, in 1990, attempted to fix the ruling in Duro67 by adding 
language to 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), which defined “powers of self-government” of the 
tribes to include “exercis[ing] criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”68  This 
amendment has come to be known as the “Duro Fix.”   
This language, depending on which circuit you agree with, the Eighth or the 
Ninth, either affirmatively recognized the inherent sovereignty of the tribes, or 
delegated the authority to the tribes, over non-member Indians.  What difference 
does it make?  If the authority is inherent, there are no double jeopardy issues.  If the 
authority is delegated, then double jeopardy exists and tribes would effectively be 
barred from prosecuting non-members for crimes committed within the reservation.    
III.  THREE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND STATUTES 
In looking at the broad picture of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, it is also necessary 
to look at three additional background statutes.  Public Law 280 deals with 
statutorily granted jurisdiction to some states.69  The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
deals with codified individual liberties which were given to Native Americans.70  The 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act deals with the regulation and oversight of gaming 
within Indian country.71 
A.  Public Law 280 
When looking at whether or not more effective criminal/felony jurisdiction 
should be given to the tribes, it is important to look at the often confusing Public 
Law 280.72  Public Law 280, or PL-280, transfers criminal jurisdiction to the state 
governments of certain “Mandatory States” and other “Optional States,” sometimes 
concurrently with the tribes, but usually exclusive of the federal government.73  The 
“Mandatory States” are: Alaska, California; Minnesota (except the Red Lake 
reservation); Nebraska; Oregon (except the Warm Springs reservation); and 
Wisconsin.74  These “Mandatory States” have been given criminal jurisdiction over 
misdemeanors and felonies committed in Indian country within the borders of the 
                                                                 
67Duro, 495 U.S. 676. 
6825 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2003). 
69Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588. 
70The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1303, 1311, 1312, 1321, 
1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1331, 1341 (2004). 
71The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, 
2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 27111, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 27117, 2717(a), 2718, 2719, 
2720, 2721 (2004).  
72Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588. 
73COHEN, supra note 4, at 5. 
74Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction, PL-280 and Other Jurisdictional Transfers, 
available at http://tribaljurisdiction.tripod.com/indiancountrycriminaljurisdiction/id4.html. 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
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state.75  The so-called “Optional States” were given the option of having criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian country over certain types of offenses established under state 
law, while the tribe retains jurisdiction over misdemeanors and the federal 
government still retains jurisdiction under the Major and General Crimes Acts.76  The 
U.S. Department of Justice has made an excellent chart to help further explain how 
criminal jurisdiction works in PL-280 states:77 
 
                                                                 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, 689 Jurisdictional Summary, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00689.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
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Offender Victim                    Jurisdiction 
Non-Indian Non-Indian State jurisdiction is exclusive of federal 
and tribal jurisdiction. 
Non-Indian Indian “Mandatory” state has jurisdiction 
exclusive of federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
“Option” state and federal government 
have jurisdiction. There is no tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Indian Non-Indian “Mandatory” state has jurisdiction 
exclusive of federal government but not 
necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal 
courts. 
Indian Indian “Mandatory” state has jurisdiction 
exclusive of federal government but not 
necessarily of the tribe. “Option” state has 
concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts 
for all offenses, and concurrent jurisdiction 
with the federal courts for those listed in 
18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
Non-Indian Victimless State jurisdiction is exclusive, although 
federal jurisdiction may attach in an option 
state if impact on individual Indian or 
tribal interest is clear. 
Indian Victimless There may be concurrent state, tribal, and 
in an option state, federal jurisdiction. 
There is no state regulatory jurisdiction. 
 
Which category a defendant falls into and whether or not the Tribal court is in a 
state which has been given PL-280 jurisdiction, can often be confusing issues.  
Under the issue of granting more effective criminal jurisdiction back to the tribes, 
however, PL-280 states would still retain jurisdiction over criminal matters which 
fall with in their state’s boundaries.   
B.  Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
Additionally, while the tribes may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the major 
crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, their ability to adequately punish 
those acts was severely curtailed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,78 which 
                                                                 
78The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/6
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only allows for tribes to apply a maximum punishment of one year in jail and a 
$5,000 maximum fine.79   
Conceived by Congress following a ruling by the United States Supreme Court in 
Talton v. Mayes,80 which held that the rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution did not apply to the tribes,81 the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
codified a limited amount of Constitutional liberties which it felt should also apply to 
the tribes.82  Similar to the Bill of Rights, the Indian Civil Rights Act defined certain 
liberties which applied to all Native Americans.  It is also applicable against tribal 
governments.  These same liberties, would apply to defendants who are subject to the 
criminal jurisdiction of the tribes.  Therefore, whatever fears a non-Indian might 
have about being denied Constitutional protections in Tribal court could be answered 
under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
C.  Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
One last statutory area which touches on crime in Indian country is the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act.83  While not a statute that grants criminal jurisdiction over 
gaming in Indian country to the tribes, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was 
created by Congress to provide regulation of the fast growing gaming, which was 
taking place in certain areas of Indian country, and to help prevent and/or “shield” 
the tribes “from organized crime and other corrupting influences.”84   
Before any tribe may conduct certain types of gaming, certain provisions of the 
Act must be complied with, and (in some cases) the tribe must receive the approval 
of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)—the administrative agency 
established by Congress to watch over Indian gaming.  It is interesting to note that 
although the purpose of the Act was to promote tribal welfare and to protect tribes 
from the influence of organized crime, the statute has no enforcement provisions.  
The Chairman of the NIGC must rely on the overburdened U.S. Attorney’s office to 
combat any violations of its provisions.  There is simply no expressed provision 
which would further protect the tribe from any organized crime, especially where 
that organized crime comes from non-Indians. 
                                                                 
79Note, however, that the Act does not impose limits on probation periods or community 
service. 
80163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
81Id. at 384. 
82COHEN, supra note 4, at § 12.E.; see also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C.  
§ 1302 (including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom from self incrimination, 
etc.). 
83The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701. 
84Id. at § 2702(2). 
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IV.  CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND THOSE WHO ARE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH IT 
With an overall background of the state of criminal jurisdiction within Indian 
country, it is now possible to look at how this jurisdictional void has had such a 
hugely negative impact on Native Americans.  Although courts and Congress have 
not expressly created this void, implicitly it exists and is doing terrible damage.  Let 
the U.S. Attorney’s do their job, you say?  This article is not attempting to imply that 
they are not doing their job, but as the statistics (compiled by the Department of 
Justice) point out, the U.S. Attorney’s office has priorities which do not seem to fall 
in the direction of crime in Indian country. 
A.  American Indians and Crime 
In February 1999, the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics released a study entitled American Indians and Crime.  The study paints a 
very disturbing picture of criminal activity among Native Americans.  The study 
found that American Indians are twice as likely as any other ethnic group in the 
United States to experience violent crimes.85  American Indians during the study 
years of 1992-96 experienced a violent crime rate of 124 per 1,000 persons aged 12 
or older, as compared to 49 per 1,000 for whites, and 61 per 1,000 for blacks.86 
 
Average annual number of violent victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 
or older, 1992-96:87 
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American Indians, as of 1998, accounted for 1% of the total United States 
population, or approximately 2.3 million people.88  Whites accounted for 82.6%, or 
                                                                 
85U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, American Indians and Crime 2, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic/pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). 
86Id. at 3. 
87Id. at 1. 
88Id.  
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222 million.89  Blacks accounted for 12.7%, or 34.3 million,90 and Asians accounted 
for 3.8%, or 10.3 million.91   
Other than for murder,92 Indians experienced higher than average rates of 
victimization for the categories of rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, 
and simple assault.93 When asked about who had committed the acts of violence 
against the victim, American Indians reported that nearly 46% of the offenses were 
committed by strangers.94  Additionally, nearly 70% of the victims of violent crimes 
among American Indians described the offender as non-Indian.95 
 
Percent of violent victimizations, by race of victim and race of offender, 
1992-96.96 
                                                                 Race of Offender 
Race of Victim Total Other White Black 
     
All Races 100%  11% 60% 29% 
American Indians 100 29 60 10 
White 100 11 69 20 
Black 100 7 12 81 
Asian 100 32 39 29 
 
Clearly, the percentages of those who are non-Indian offenders of Indian victims 
is staggering.  While the tribe may be able to punish those who commit these 
offenses where they are Indian, nearly 70% cannot be punished by the tribe at all, 
and it is worrisome to guess the number of those 70% who go unpunished due to the 
federal government’s inability or lack of desire to do so.   
Certainly, the United States Attorney General’s office would prosecute those 
more serious crimes, such as murder.  However, the offenses committed in Indian 
                                                                 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92American Indians experienced 150 murders, per 100,000 people, which is close the per 
capita rate for the entire nation. 
93U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 85, at 1. 
94Id. at 6. 
95Id. at 7 (“The majority (60%) of American Indian victims of violent crime described the 
offender as white, and nearly 30% of the offenders were likely to have been other American 
Indians.  An estimated 10% of offenders were described as black.”). 
96Id. at 7. 
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country may not fall high enough on their priority list at the time they are reported, 
and may, in fact, go unpunished. 
 
For example (see chart above), for the statistical year of October 1999 to 
September 2000, the Attorney General’s office investigated 117,450 total federal 
offenses nationwide.97  Of those, 5,641 (or 4.8%) were considered “violent offenses,” 
which are categorized as murder, assault, robbery, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and 
threats against the President.98  Of the 5,641 “violent offenses,” 60% were 
prosecuted, and 30% of the cases were declined.99  Only 4,250 of the total number of 
“violent offenders” were arrested.100  Of the 3,732 offenders actually prosecuted, 
only 2,676 were convicted.101  Compare this with the number of federal drug offenses 
investigated, and we see that of the 117,450 total offenses investigated, 37,009 (or 
32%) were drug related.102  Of those 37,009, roughly 80% were prosecuted, and only 
roughly 20% were declined.103  Obviously the Attorney General’s office has certain 
priorities set up when looking at which offenses to prosecute.  Unfortunately for 
American Indians, their offenses fall more under the “violent offenses” category for 
which very little priority is given.104 
                                                                 
97U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice 
Statistics, 2000, at http://www.ojp.udoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfjs00.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) 
[hereinafter Compendium]. 
98Id. 
99Id. 
100Id. at 9. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
103Id. at 29. 
104For example, during the same time period as the U.S. Department of Justice 
Compendium, 9,578 cases of “violent offenses” were reported just in Indian country alone, but 
only 5,641 “violent offenses” were looked into by the Attorney General’s office nationwide.  
 
 
 
                       Comparison of Violent and Drug Offenses* 
    Total U.S. Offenses: 117, 450  
    Violent Offenses: 5,641 4.8% (of Total) 
    Prosecuted: 3,732 60% (of violent) 
    Declined: 1,909 30% (of violent) 
    Drug Offenses: 37,009 32% (of Total) 
    Prosecuted: 26,917 78% (of Drug) 
    Declined: 6,126 16% (of Drug) 
* Data and Percentages taken from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000. 
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B.  Crime Due to Gaming 
These “violent crime” rates could be expected to grow even larger with the influx 
of money and persons to Indian country due to gambling.  While many gambling 
towns, such as Atlantic City, do not appear to experience a rise in crime rates when 
tourists are kept out of the equation, many researchers agree that with a large influx 
of people, crime rates are going to rise.105  Whether this is attributed to the gambling 
or to the larger number of people going to Indian country does not need to be 
debated in this paper.   
Whatever the cause, crime rates are likely to increase.  In a question and answer 
interview with one-year incumbent police chief Gary Jeandron, of the Palm Springs, 
California Police Department, the Desert Sun newspaper asked Chief Jeandron 
whether Indian gaming in California had increased the rate of crime in the area.106  
His answer:  “A successful business that brings in a large amount of population and 
influences the demographics, you are going to have increased crime . . . . [I]f you 
have an increased amount of people coming in, you are going to have more 
crime.”107  With the tribes being able to punish only the worst of these offenders with 
one year in jail or a $5,000 fine, and in the cases of non-Indians, not at all, these 
offenders can run rampant in Indian country with little to no fear of punishment. 
Again, this article is not attempting to argue the evils of gambling itself, but is 
merely trying to show that sources indicate that where there is a large increase in 
population, whether as new move-ins or tourists, the crime rate is likely to increase 
as well.  Also, the probability is high that a large portion of those coming to Indian 
country to gamble will be non-Indian.  While the non-Indian victims will see 
restitution of their injuries due to the fact that the federal government and states have 
criminal jurisdiction over them, it is not as likely that the Indian victims will see the 
same result. 
But even if tribes had the jurisdiction necessary to combat crime due to gaming 
or otherwise, do tribes have the law enforcement and judicial resources to effectively 
deal with it?  There would be no need to make criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
in Indian country exclusive to the tribes.  But what law enforcement and judicial 
resources currently exist?  
C.  Policing on American Indian Reservations 
In another report by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, entitled Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, the Justice Department determined 
                                                          
See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, 3, 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/tle00.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
105Gambling and Crime, Crime Rates, at http://www.casinochecker.com/casino_ 
knowledge/crime/rates.htm (last visited June 7, 2004). 
106Cindy Uken, Desert Sun Quizzes Palm Springs Police Chief, THE DESERT SUN (June 1, 
2003), at http://www.thedesertsun.com/news/stories2003/opinion/20030531174753.shtml (last 
visited June 7, 2004). 
107Id. 
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that out of 562 federally recognized tribal entities, only 171 tribes had law 
enforcement agencies with at least one or more officers.108  An additional 37 tribes 
receive law enforcement through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.109   
As the reservation policy was implemented, policing on the reservation consisted 
entirely of policing by United States soldiers,110 who obviously did not have the 
interests of the tribal members in mind.  In the 1860’s, American Indians were 
allowed to join the ranks of the tribal police forces, although they were often looked 
down upon by other tribal members as agents of the federal government.111  This type 
of control, a few tribal members working with, but mostly being supervised by, the 
federal government lasted for close to the next eighty to ninety years until the 
1950’s, 60’s, and 70’s.112  However, some tribes, due to neglect from the federal 
government, and due to an issue of sovereignty, had their own tribal police forces as 
well. 
During the 1960’s and 70’s the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) created and 
managed the “first modernized reservation police forces,”113 as well as established 
the BIA Law Enforcement Academy.114  It was also during this time that the era of 
“self determination” began to evolve among the tribes, and more and more tribes 
began establishing, and in some cases re-establishing, stronger tribal governments 
and courts.115 
In the National Institute of Justice report entitled Policing on American Indian 
Reservations, the authors create a rough estimate of the makeup of a typical Indian 
country police department.  On the average, the typical police department is either 
managed directly by the BIA, or indirectly through contract where the BIA merely 
provides the funding but is administered and employed by the tribe.116  The average 
police department polices 500,000 acres of land (roughly the size of Delaware) with 
a total of 16 police officers (only a slight majority are Indian), all of whom would 
obviously not be on duty at the same time.117  Those 16 or fewer police officers 
would be responsible for 10,000 tribal members (which of course does not include 
any non-tribal members living there), while serving in dilapidated police buildings 
                                                                 
108U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Tribal Law Enforcement, 2000, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/tle00.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2003). 
109Id. 
110STEWART WAKELING ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT: 
POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 41 (2001). 
111Id.  
112Id. at 42. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Id. at 7, 9. 
117Id. at 9. 
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and driving very worn out police vehicles, all of which would operate on a budget of 
$1 million or less.118 
Today, only a small percentage of tribes have law enforcement agencies or their 
own tribal judiciary, and a few are still controlled by the BIA.119  But, as was 
mentioned above, criminal jurisdiction need not be exclusive to the tribe.  Criminal 
jurisdiction could be held concurrently with the federal government or even the state, 
which could prosecute those cases where adequate tribal courts, jails or law 
enforcement is not found.  But where a tribe does have sufficient resources and 
desire, the tribe should be allowed to conduct full criminal jurisdiction and 
punishment.  A current example can be found in the State of Oklahoma with the 
Cherokee Nation.  The Cherokee Nation and Oklahoma have teamed their law 
enforcement resources so that some law enforcement officers from the state and 
those of the tribe are cross-deputized to deal with any matters which may occur when 
the other is not around or lacks the resources to adequately deal with it.   
The same process is often done with prison systems.  Another example from the 
State of Oklahoma is the Creek Juvenile Detention Center which shares juvenile 
bedding with the state.  But, there are tribes which have the resources to adequately 
adjudicate and incarcerate criminals.  The next section briefly explains the status of 
courts and prisons in Indian country. 
D.  Tribal Courts and Prisons in Indian Country 
Historically, many tribes had ways of dealing with problems created within the 
tribe, whether it was disputes between or among families.  If the problem was serious 
enough, the offender was often banished from the tribe.  Tribes began to have a more 
formal/Americanized look to their judicial systems in the early 1900’s.  Due to the 
fear and lack of understanding of how offenders were punished among the tribes, 
Congress created the Courts of Indian Offenses (more specifically in response to the 
holding in Crow Dog120).121  The Courts of Indian Offenses took over the traditional 
role of the tribes in settling disputes among its members and had no jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.122   
                                                                 
118Id. 
119In 1995, the BIA created a survey which showed that of a total of 178 total tribal law 
enforcement agencies, 88 had agencies created through a contract with the BIA, 64 were 
administered completely by the BIA, 22 were completely administered by the tribe, but funded 
through a block grant from the BIA, and 4 tribes administered and funded their own law 
enforcement agencies.  Id. at 7. 
120109 U.S. 556 (1883); see supra Part I.A. 
121B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System, UNIVERSITY OF 
OKLAHOMA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER 2 (Mar. 2000), at http://w3.ouhsc.edu/ccan/ 
Tribal%20Courts.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2003). 
122Id. at 4. 
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With the nodding approval of Congress, many tribes instituted, or re-instituted, 
more formalized judicial systems beginning in the early 1930’s.123  Early on, those 
tribes which operated their own judicial systems had judges and attorneys who were 
often untrained in the law, but more recently this is becoming less frequent.124  Many 
judges and attorneys now have law degrees.125  But some of the untrained judges and 
attorneys still remain.   
Today, courts in Indian country are a mix of tribal courts and courts administered 
by the BIA.126  As stated above, not every tribe has the resources or perhaps even the 
desire to have its own judicial systems, and unfortunately, this author was unable to 
locate any statistical information regarding the exact number of tribal judicial 
systems now operating.  The Department of Justice, however, is currently conducting 
a survey to determine this information entitled, 2002 Census of Tribal Justice 
Agencies in American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdictions, but has not yet 
published this information on its website. 
Thankfully, the Department of Justice has conducted a survey of jails in Indian 
country, appropriately entitled, Jails in Indian Country, 2001.127  As of 2001, the 
Department of Justice has determined that a total of 68 correctional facilities exist,128 
in one form or another, within Indian country, where a total of 2,030 persons were 
awaiting trial or serving sentences.129  Of those in custody, 1600 were adults, and 312 
were juveniles.130  The total capacity of the 68 correctional facilities in Indian 
country was 2,101 and were at 91% of capacity as of 2001, but were at 125% of 
capacity during the peak summer months.131  Of the 2,030 persons being held in 
correctional facilities in Indian country, misdemeanor charges accounted for 1,738 of 
the inmates, while felony charges accounted for 113.132  The disparity is not illogical 
when one remembers that tribal courts can only impose a maximum sentence of one 
year and/or a $5,000 fine.  It would not make much sense for a tribe to charge too 
many persons with felonies that could only be punished for such a short amount of 
                                                                 
123Id. at 5. 
124Id. 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Jails in Indian 
Country, 2001 (May 2002) at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#jic (last visited Oct. 
4, 2003). 
128The 10 largest facilities held more than 60% of the total number of inmates in Indian 
country correctional facilities, with 7 of the 10 facilities being located in the State of Arizona.  
See id. at 3. 
129Id. at 1. 
130Id. 
131Id.  
132Id. at 2. 
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time, probation time notwithstanding.  But whether tribes have the resources or not, 
it is refreshing to note the seemingly 180 degree change in how Congress is currently 
viewing its criminal jurisdictional role in Indian country. 
V.  CHANGING FEDERAL/STATE VIEW/ROLE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Ironic, and somewhat surprising, is the changing federal congressional view/role 
in Indian country.  Long the bane of the tribes’ desire for increasing tribal 
sovereignty, Congress is now pushing for a larger role for the tribes in combating 
crime in Indian country.  And once a defender of what little was acknowledged of 
tribal sovereignty, the courts are now waging a war to remove effective jurisdiction 
over Indian non-Tribal criminals.  This section looks briefly at a few federal 
initiatives which have been aimed at decreasing tribal dependence on federal 
assistance as well as a strong push by Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) to raise 
tribal sovereignty to that enjoyed by the states.  Additionally, this section will briefly 
discuss the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Lara133 from the Eighth 
Circuit, with the Eighth Circuit originally holding that tribal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians was a delegated power from Congress134 and therefore implicitly 
removes Tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 
Also recognizing the increasing violent crime rate among American Indians, the 
United States Department of Justice created the Indian Country Justice Initiative 
(ICJI) in order to “streamline the Justice Department’s support for Indian 
Country.”135  The initiative instituted several pilot programs with the hope of 
instructing and strengthening the tribal members to handle problems by employing 
traditional and modern mechanisms.136  Additionally, the Department of Justice is 
working in conjunction with the Department of Interior on the CIRCLE Project. 
A.  The CIRCLE Project 
The CIRCLE project, or Comprehensive Indian Resources for Community and 
Law Enforcement project, is a three year project that was created by the Department 
of Justice to help curb the rising violent crime rate in Indian country by teaming up 
with the local Indian communities.137  Rather than create a new program which 
would require federal funding, the CIRCLE project utilizes the existing resources of 
the Department of Justice and the tribes.138  The central focus of the project is in 
developing creative and effective solutions from the tribes themselves, which make 
                                                                 
133324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003). 
134Id. at 640. 
135Kim Baca, The Changing Federal Role in Indian Country, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE JOURNAL 9 (Apr. 2001), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/jr000247c.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2003). 
136Id. 
137United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2. 
138Id. 
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recommendations to the federal government on ways to handle certain problems on 
the reservation.139   
One of the first tribes to receive assistance from the project was the Northern 
Cheyenne tribe located near Billings, Montana.140  The tribe applied for the project 
due to the rising increase in juvenile crime because of methamphetamine, as well as 
an overall increase in violent activity on the reservation.141  Initial reports from the 
tribe showed that juvenile criminal activity declined by more than half following the 
implementation of the project.142  The Oglala Sioux tribe of South Dakota, also a 
participant in the project, noted a decrease in gang activity and domestic violence.143  
These tribes were not financially well off, but were willing to do whatever necessary 
to bring order back to the tribes.  Additionally, on a side note, the CIRCLE project 
tribes went above and beyond the project following the tragic events of September 
11, 2001 when they jumped in their vehicles and drove across country to aid in the 
search and rescue efforts as well as in the recovery of the citizens and city of New 
York.144   
One of the highlights of the CIRCLE project is that so much was done to improve 
the situations of these two tribes without any additional funding from the federal 
government.  Some might argue that if tribes regain their full sovereign status or 
merely achieve the sovereignty enjoyed by the states, that the federal government 
should remove all financial assistance from the tribes.  And while some tribes are 
financially better off than many states (due to gaming), many tribes would 
effectively disappear if financial assistance were removed.  However, states enjoy an 
elevated sovereign status above and beyond that of the tribes and still receive federal 
financial assistance; therefore, an argument for improving the sovereign status in line 
with that of the States would seem to be fair.  This is exactly what Senator Inouye is 
attempting to do with his proposed amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 
2002; He is arguing that tribes should be as sovereign as any state.145 
B.  Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Senator Inouye has introduced an amendment to the Homeland Security Act of 
2002146 which would recognize tribal sovereign powers over non-Indians.  In the 
Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Senator 
                                                                 
139Baca, supra note 135, at 10. 
140Id. 
141Id. 
142United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2. 
143Baca, supra note 135, at 10. 
144United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 2. 
145Inouye Ties Sovereignty to Homeland Security, INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 25, 2003), at 
http://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?ID=2003/02/25/inouye (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
146Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
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Inouye, along with Senator Daniel Akaka (HI), Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell 
(CO), and Senator Maria Cantwell (WA) co-sponsored this bill with the goal “to 
overturn recent Supreme Court rulings by recognizing that tribes have primary law 
enforcement duties on their lands.”147  In addressing the National Congress of 
American Indians in Washington, D.C., Senator Inouye said,  
Homeland security presents an opportunity . . . to secure a status under 
federal law that will not only recognize your powers and responsibilities 
as sovereign governments but will strengthen your position and your 
status in the family of governments that make up the United States . . . . 
Least of all, you should be as sovereign as any state in the union.148 
The “Findings and Purposes” section of the proposed amendment suggests that 
Congress find that each Indian tribal government possesses the inherent sovereign 
authority: 
(A) (i) to establish its own form of government; 
(ii) to adopt a constitution or other organic governing documents; and 
(iii) to establish a tribal judicial system; and 
(B) to provide for the health and safety of those who reside on tribal lands, 
including the provision of law enforcement services on lands under the 
jurisdiction of the tribal government . . . .149 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure the inclusion of the Indian tribes in discussions 
involving homeland security as well as to make sure the tribes participate “fully in 
the protection of the homeland of the United States.”150  If approved, Congress will 
have come a long way from its earlier days of stripping the tribes of nearly 
everything they were and owned to a period where it is now making a more sincere 
effort to support the tribes in their increased sovereignty during a period of self-
determination.  This amendment is still pending. 
If Senator Inouye and others get their wish, tribes would not only regain criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes within Indian country, but the 
wording of the amendment also seems to imply that tribes would have jurisdiction 
over foreign nationals as well.  If that is not its intention, then including it as part of 
the Homeland Security Act would not make any sense.  In order for the tribes to aid 
the United States in the defense of the “homeland,” it would be necessary for them to 
have full criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing crimes within Indian 
country.  The United States Supreme Court seemed poised to strike another blow to 
tribal criminal jurisdiction by implicitly removing tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-member Indians. 
                                                                 
147Id. 
148Id. 
149Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, S. 578, 108th 
Cong. § 2 (2003). 
150Senate Bill 578. 
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C.  United States v. Lara and United States v. Enas 
The courts, once friendly towards Indian sovereignty, even if on a lowered status, 
however, appear to be the ones who are now taking large swipes at what little is left 
of Indian criminal jurisdiction.  Recently, in United States v. Lara,151 the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit suggested that the ultimate arbiter of what sovereign 
powers the tribes have should be held in the United States Supreme Court and not 
Congress—where those powers are not dealing with areas which would fall under 
the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.152   
The Ninth Circuit, however, in United States v. Enas153 held that decisions made 
by Congress, such as the “Duro Fix” legislation, were a legitimate exercise of 
Congressional authority.  The Supreme Court took up the argument on an appeal of 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lara.154     
Both cases dealt with the double jeopardy issue and whether or not a tribe or the 
federal government could prosecute the defendants when either of the other had 
already done so.  The argument stems back to the one posed by the holdings in 
Wheeler155 and Duro,156 namely, do tribes have jurisdiction over non-member 
Indians, and if so whether or not the tribes were acting under inherent power or 
delegated powers because of the “Duro Fix”? 
1.  United States v. Enas 
Enas, a member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, while on the White Mountain 
Apache Reservation was arrested and charged with “assault with a deadly weapon, 
and assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury”157 to Joseph Kessay.158  Enas 
pled guilty to the charges but later fled while on work release.159  While on the lam, a 
federal grand jury filed charges against Enas in Federal District Court, which 
dismissed the grand jury indictment on the basis that the Tribe was not a separate 
sovereign from the United States, and was therefore in violation of the double 
jeopardy clause.160  Following a reversal ordered by a three-judge panel from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the entire court took up the issue de novo.161 
                                                                 
151324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003). 
152Id. at 639. 
153255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001). 
154324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003). 
155435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
156495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
157Enas, 255 F.3d 662, at 665. 
158Id. 
159Id. 
160Id. 
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The tribes, stated the court, retain all sovereignty “which is not inconsistent with 
their status as ‘conquered’ and ‘dependant’ nations.”162  In other words the 
sovereignty they retain is only that which is “needed to control [the tribes’] own 
internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order.”163  
Congress, the court found, has the authority to grant or take away any and/or all of 
this authority.164   
The debate centered on whether this authority was inherent to the tribe.  “Who 
prevails,” asks the court, “when the dispute between court and Congress is neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but a matter of common law based on history?  After 
all . . . Duro (as well as the cases upon which Duro relies) rests on its interpretation 
of the historical attributes of tribal power.”165  Nowhere in Duro166 is there any 
mention of constitutional implications, explained the court.167  It would be 
“extraordinary,” explained the court, for Duro168 to be based on constitutional 
principles without actually mentioning the Constitution.169  Additionally, the court 
pointed to language in the legislative history of the “Duro Fix” which specifically 
states that the statute was an affirmation of inherent tribal powers, and not a 
delegation of them.170 
The court found that the holding in Duro171 was in fact based on common law, 
and “within the realm of federal common law—and the federal common law of 
tribes—Congress is supreme.”172  And, as often seems the case, the Eighth Circuit 
completely disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding, with a holding of its own in 
Lara,173 which found that tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was a 
delegated power not inherent.174  Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court 
denied a hearing on appeal for the Enas175 case. 
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2.  United States v. Lara 
Lara, like Enas, was a non-member Indian on another tribe’s reservation;176 
specifically, the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation.177  Initially, Lara was arrested by 
tribal police officers from the BIA and informed that he had been banned from the 
reservation by tribal order, whereupon Lara punched one of the officers.178  Lara was 
charged in tribal court of “violence to a policeman, resisting lawful arrest, public 
intoxication, disobedience to a lawful order of the tribal court and trespassing.”179  
Lara was sentenced to a total of 155 days after he pled guilty to the first three 
charges.180  The federal government then instituted proceedings against Lara for 
assault on a federal officer (the officer was part of the BIA), and Lara requested a 
motion to dismiss, arguing, like Enas, that this was a violation of double jeopardy.181  
The magistrate judge denied Lara’s motion, and Lara appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit.182 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit found that the threshold issue turned on 
whether or not a tribe’s sovereignty in criminal jurisdiction over non-member 
Indians was inherent, or delegated by Congress.183  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, 
however, the Eighth Circuit held that rather than the issue being a federal common 
law issue, “the distinction between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of 
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately entrusted to the 
Supreme Court.184   
Whatever jurisdiction tribes had, Congress took away from them, and what little 
was returned, was done so under delegation through treaties or statutes.185  These 
treaties and statutes, held the court, were done so under the authority given to 
Congress by the Constitution, and were therefore, constitutionally delegated powers 
rather than federal common law powers.186  Exercising criminal jurisdiction over 
non-member Indians, the court explained, was an “external relation” which the 
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Supreme Court had held in Duro,187 to have no longer existed in the tribes, and could 
only be “fixed” through a delegation of Constitutional powers.188   
Just like after the holding in Duro,189 however, the federal government came to 
the rescue (an unimaginable sense of irony, the U.S. Congressional “Cavalry” 
coming to the aid of the tribes).  The United States Solicitor General, backed by the 
Bush administration in its “urging the Supreme Court to affirm the inherent powers 
of tribal governments,”190 took a very pro-tribal argument in arguing for Congress’ 
ability and authority to restore tribal sovereignty in criminal matters.  
The Solicitor General’s Office, in its petition for writ of certiorari argued four 
main reasons for granting the review of the Lara case:  a) that the “Duro Fix” 
legislation is a common law fix and not a constitutional fix, and therefore falls 
squarely under the proper authority of Congress to legislate and correct; b) that the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals conflict with one another requiring a 
uniform decision; c) that the Eighth Circuit greatly erred in attempting to “rewrite” 
the intent of Congress in the “Duro Fix” legislation; d) that agreeing with the Eighth 
Circuit would completely undermine what little authority tribal judiciaries have left 
over criminal matters in Indian country.191 
The Solicitor’s Petition also pointed to studies conducted by the Senate and 
House which took place prior to the adoption of the “Duro Fix” amendment.192  The 
reports pointed out that if the Duro decision were to be left “as is,” that a 
jurisdictional void would be created in Indian country due to the fact that the federal 
and state governments have little resources or little incentive to go after 
misdemeanor crimes taking place in Indian country.193  Even in PL-280 states, where 
the state does have jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, the committees found 
that they were unwilling to pursue misdemeanor defendants.194  Additionally, since 
lesser-included offenses have also been deemed to fall under the auspices of the 
double jeopardy clause, even the prosecution of the misdemeanor offenses in Tribal 
courts would bar prosecution of the “greater-encompassing offenses.”195  Therefore, 
the Solicitor General’s Office argued, non-member Indians would have a great 
incentive to be tried and punished in tribal courts and thereby avoid any more serious 
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federal prosecution and sentence.196  However correct the Solicitor’s arguments may 
have been, the argument that a jurisdictional void would be created has fallen on deaf 
Supreme Court ears before, and was merely brushed aside.197 
As is often the case where two Federal Circuit Courts disagree on an issue, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently weighed in on the delegation vs. inherent powers 
dilemma.198  Referring to the Constitution’s broad grant of power over Indian affairs 
to Congress, the Court held that “Congress does possess the constitutional power to 
lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians . . . .”199  Congress used this power, held the Court, merely to relax 
restrictions to the tribes’ inherent sovereignty to “control events that occur upon the 
tribe’s own land.”200   
This recent ruling by the Court could be interpreted very broadly to mean that 
should Congress so desire, it could “relax” more restrictions on Indian sovereignty 
by passing new legislation which could give tribes jurisdiction over anyone and 
everyone.  Certainly, should it so desire, it could grant jurisdiction to tribes over 
foreign nationals as is being proposed in the Tribal Government Amendments to the 
Homeland Security Act discussed above. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Will the courts continue to erode at what little is left of tribal sovereignty over 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, or will they begin to follow the trend now 
found among their colleagues in Congress, to assist in the self-determination of the 
tribes?  It is clear that something must be done.   
If the courts and Congress determine that the jurisdiction lies with the federal 
government rather than the tribes, then they both need do something about the 
spiraling rise in violent crime rates in Indian country.  The best solution would be to 
work with the tribes, either by giving back full/concurrent jurisdictional control over 
criminal matters which take place in Indian country, or to find alternate solutions to 
prevent this great injustice.  With the revenue from gaming and other enterprises, 
which is now finding its way to some of the tribes, it would behoove the federal 
government to continue to work closely with these and other tribes to make sure 
some of it is earmarked for the improvement of law enforcement and judicial 
entities.  Yet, what incentive do tribes have to make these improvements when they 
continue to lack effective criminal jurisdiction over those who are committing the 
majority of the crimes? 
                                                                 
196Id. at 23. 
197See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (1978); Duro, 495 U.S. at 696 (1990). 
198United States v. Lara, 158 L. Ed. 2d. 420, 428 (2004). 
199Id. 
200Id. at 431. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/6
